Randi Hebertson v. Bank One : Petition for Writ of Certiorari by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
2000
Randi Hebertson v. Bank One : Petition for Writ of
Certiorari
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Brian S. King; King & Isaacson; Attorney for Appellant.
Richard K. Glauser, D. Joseph Cartwright; Smith & Glauser; Attorneys for Appellees.
This Petition for Certiorari is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah
Supreme Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Petition for Certiorari, Hebertson v. Bank One, No. 20000004.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2000).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/370
DOCUMENT 
KFU 
45.9 
S9 /•» 
DOCKET NO. J22£23 
BRIEF V 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
RANDI HEBERTSON, 
Plaintiff/Appellant/Respondent, 
vs. 
BANK ONE, UTAH, N.A., formerly 
known as VALLEY BANK & TRUST 
COMPANY, and DIME SAVINGS 
BANK OF NEW YORK, FSB, dba 
WILLOWCREEK PLAZA, 
WILLOWCREEK SHOPPING 
VILLAGE, LTD., and, 
WILLOWCREEK PLAZA 
EXECUTIVE OFFICES 
Defendant/Appellee/Petitioner. 
WILLOWCREEK PLAZA'S PETITION 
FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
Supreme Court 
CaseNo.gfflgW j /QQflf lOft H ~ 5 C 
Court of Appeals 
Case No. 9 
Trial court 
CaseNo.930905383PI 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI FOR 
REVIEW OF JUDGMENT OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JUDGES MICHAEL J. WILKINS, 
GREGORY K. ORME, AND NORMAN H. JACKSON 
Richard K. Glauser, #4324 
D. Joseph Cartwright, #7697 
SMITH & GLAUSER, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee/Petitioner 
Parkview Plaza 
2180 South 1300 East, Suite 410 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Brian s. King 
KING & ISAACSON 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
4 Triad Center, Suite 825 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84180 , 
UTAH SUPREMECOURT 
» ' 1 - 3 2000 
pAT 
wi-L». 
-MQLOMEW 
HE COURT Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
RANDIHEBERTSON,. ) 
Plaintiff/Appellant/Respondent, } 
vs. ) 
BANK ONE, UTAH, N.A., formerly 
known as VALLEY BANK & TRUST ; 
COMPANY, and DIME SAVINGS 
BANK OF NEW YORK, FSB, dba ; 
WILLOWCREEK PLAZA, ; 
WILLOWCREEK SHOPPING 
VILLAGE, LTD., and, ; 
WILLOWCREEK PLAZA 
EXECUTIVE OFFICES 
Defendant/Appellee/Petitioner. 
I WILLOWCREEK PLAZA'S PETITION 
1 FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
1 Supreme Court 
) Case No. 950264 
) Court of Appeals 
) Case No. 940223-CA 
1 Trial court 
) Case No. 9309053 83PI 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI FOR 
REVIEW OF JUDGMENT OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JUDGES MICHAEL J. WILKINS, 
GREGORY K. ORME, AND NORMAN H. JACKSON 
Richard K. Glauser, #4324 Brian s. King 
D. Joseph Cartwright, #7697 KING & ISAACSON 
SMITH & GLAUSER, P.C. Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee/Petitioner 4 Triad Center, Suite 825 
Parkview Plaza Salt Lake City, Utah 84180 
2180 South 1300 East, Suite 410 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
TABLE OF CONTENTS : i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Hi 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 1 
OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL REPORTS 1 
. JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT 1 
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE: 
NATURE OF THE CASE 2 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION 
IN THE LOWER COURTS 2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 4 
ARGUMENT: 
1. Plaintiffs first complaint naming a non-existent defendant is 
a complete nullity. Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40 therefore 
does not apply and Plaintiffs three subsequent refillings are 
barred by the statute of limitations 8 
2. Even if the savings statute applies, plaintiff is only entitled to one 
re-filing of her complaint, not four 11 
3. Whether Plaintiff is allowed one or multiple refilings under § 78-12-
40, she nevertheless cannot name new parties who were not 
named in the original complaint and who have no identity of interest 
to the defendant named in her first complaint 15 
CONCLUSION 19 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 20 
i 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ADDENDUM 21 
ii 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES PAGE 
Bush v. Cole. 110 N.E. 1056 (Ohio 1912) : 13 
Cady v. Harlan. 442 S.W.2d 517 (Mo. 1969) 13 
Dayv. NLOInc. 798 F.Supp. 1322 (S.D. Ohio 1992) 11 
Dunn v. Kelly. 675 P.2d 571 (Utah 1983) 10-11 
• Estate of Haro v. Haro. 887 P.2d 878 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) 9-11,18 
Hebertson v. Willowcreek Plaza. 923 P.2d 1389,1390 (Utah 1996) 4, 7,16 
Hebertson v. Willowcreek Plaza. 895 P.2d 839 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) 6,16 
Hebertson v. Willowcreek Plaza. 910 P.2d 425 (Utah 1995) 7 
Hunter v. Ward. 15 F.2d 843 (8th Cir. 1926) 12-13 
Jordan v. Commissioners of Bristol County. 167 N.E. 652 (Mass. 1929) 11,17 
Lee v. Gaufin. 867 P.2d 572 (Utah 1993) 18 
Marangio v. Shop Rite Supermarkets. Inc.. 11 Conn.App. 156, 55 A.2d 1389,1391 
(1987), cert denied, 204 Conn. 809, 528 A.2d 1155(1987) 12 
McCoy Enterprises v. Vaughn. 268 S.E.2d 764 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980) 11,17 
Meadow Fresh Farms v. Utah State Univ.. 813 P.2d 1216 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) 12 
Morrow v. Atlanta & C. Air Line Ry. Co.. 66 S.E. 186 (S.C. 1909) 13 
Perrv v. Pioneer Wholesale Supply Co.. 681 P.2d 214 (Utah 1984) 16,18 
Pintavalle v. Valkanos. 581 A.2d 1050 (Conn. 1990) 14 
Roaozinski v. American Food Service Equip.. 643 A.2d 300 (Conn. App. 1994) 13 
Sylvester v.Steinberg. 505 N.E.2d 28 (III. App., 4 Dist. 1987) 12-13 
Hi 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Turner v. Aldor Co. of Nashville. Inc.. 827 S.W.2d 318 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991)... 13,17 
United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Swyden. 475, P.2d 284 (Okla. 1935) 12-14 
Williams v. Zortman Mining. Inc.. 914 P.2d 971 (Mont. 1996) •.; 16-17 
Worlev v. Pierce. 440 S.E.2d 749 (Ga. App. 1994) 13 
STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. §78-12-40 (1953) 1-3, 8-12,14-15 
. Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2(3)(a) 1-2 
RULES 
Rule 15(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 15-16,18 
Rule 17 (a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 10 
Rule 17(d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 5 
iv 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Is a complaint which is timely filed but which names as the only defendant 
a non-entity not capable of being sued eligible for refiling pursuant to Utah Code §78-12-
40 when it was dismissed without prejudice after the expiration of the applicable statute 
of limitations? 
2. Did the Court of Appeals err in determining that a plaintiff may continually 
avoid the statute of limitations by filing successive complaints, so long as each refiling 
occurs within one year of the most recent dismissal? 
3. Did the Court of Appeals err in determining that new parties not named in 
the original complaint may be added after a statute of limitations has run, thereby 
avoiding the expired four-year statute of limitations? 
OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL REPORTS 
The Court of Appeals decision in this matter is referenced as 1999 UT App 342. 
Petitioner is not aware of any other reference to the Court of Appeals decision. 
JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT 
Pursuant to Utah Code § 78-2-2(3)(a), the Supreme Court of Utah has jurisdiction 
over the judgment of the Court of Appeals in this matter which was entered on December 
1 
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2", 1999. Utah Code § 78-2-2(3)(a). 
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS 
Utah Code §78-12-40 (1953), otherwise known as the savings statute, is the 
controlling statutory provision in this case. It states as follows: 
If any action is commenced within due time and a judgment 
thereon for the plaintiff is reversed, or if the plaintiff fails in 
such action or upon a cause of action otherwise than upon the 
merits, and the time limited whether by law or contract for 
commencement the same shall have expired, the plaintiff, or 
if he dies and the cause of action survives, his representatives, 
may commence a new action within one year after the 
reversal or failure. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is a slip and fall case arising out of plaintiff s alleged injuries she received in 
1988 while traveling with her daughter to an appointment at Willowcreek Plaza, a 
professional office complex in Salt Lake County. Plaintiff alleges she slipped and fell on 
some ice, sustaining back injuries. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition in Lower Courts 
On May 23, 1997, plaintiff filed a complaint in the Third District Court alleging 
that on December 31, 1988 she was injured in a slip and fall accident that occurred on 
premises owned by defendants. (R. 1-2) This was not plaintiffs first attempt to pursue 
litigation over this incident. In fact, plaintiff had filed three previous complaints, all in 
2 
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Third District Court, each seeking relief for her alleged injuries stemming from the 
December 31, 1988 incident. (R. 2-5) Only the first complaint was timely filed within 
the applicable statute of limitations for personal injuries, which is four years. (R. 2, 53-
62) 
However, each of the first three complaints were dismissed without prejudice. The 
first two were dismissed pursuant to motions filed by parties not named in the actions but 
who were served with process. In the first and second actions plaintiff named as the sole 
defendant "Willowcreek Plaza," which in reality is merely the name on the building 
where plaintiffs slip and fall occurred. The third complaint was voluntarily dismissed by 
plaintiff. (R. 5,15) When plaintiff filed her fourth complaint naming new defendants not 
named in the original complaint, defendants moved to dismiss the complaint. (R. 12) 
Defendants' motion argued that plaintiff was only entitled to refile her complaint once 
under Utah's savings statute found at Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40 (1953) and that even if 
she was entitled to multiple refilings, she could not name new parties who were not 
named in the original complaint or who did not have an identity of interest with the 
original defendant. (R. 15-20). 
The Honorable Judge Timothy R. Hanson granted defendants' motion. Since he 
considered matters outside the pleadings, defendant's motion to dismiss was treated as a 
motion for summary judgment. (R. 92/32 & 83) The order granting summary judgment 
was signed on April 8,1998. (R. 82) 
3 
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Plaintiff appealed Judge Hanson's Order granting summary judgment on May 7, 
1998. On December 2, 1999, the Utah Court of Appeals reversed the summary judgment, 
and remanded the case for trial. (Court of Appeals opinion, attached hereto as Addendum 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Plaintiffs complaint alleges that she was injured in a slip and fall that 
occurred on the premises of a business complex known as "Willowcreek Plaza" on 
December 31,1988. (R. 2) 
2. On or about November 20, 1992, nearly four years after the incident and 
only 38 days short of the expiration of the four-year statute of limitation set forth at Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-12-25(1) (1953), plaintiff filed a complaint in the Third District Court. 
(R. 3, 53) 
3. This first of four complaints named as the sole defendant "Willowcreek 
Plaza." (R.3) 
4. Plaintiff served her first complaint on Willowcreek Plaza, L.C., the owner 
of the premises at the time the complaint was filed. (R. 15, 71) See, also Hebertson v. 
Willowcreek Plaza. 923 P.2d 1389.1390 (Utah 1996). 
5. However, Willowcreek Plaza, L.C., did not own the property at the time of 
the alleged incident and instead had purchased it from an interim owner who had 
purchased it, Valley Bank and Dime Savings Bank who jointly owned the premises at the 
4 
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time of plaintiff s slip and fall. (R. 72-73) 
6. Willowcreek Plaza L.C. filed a motion to dismiss shortly thereafter arguing 
that it did not own the building at the time of the incident and that the named defendant 
"Willowcreek Plaza" was merely the name on the building and did not exist as an entity 
that could sue or be sued. (R. 3, 15, 72-73) 
7. The Honorable Judge Leslie Lewis granted the motion to dismiss that in 
fact "Willowcreek Plaza" did not have the capacity to be sued and that Willowcreek Plaza 
L.C. did not own the premises at the time of the incident. (Court of Appeals Opinion, 
paragraph 4) 
8. The order dismissing plaintiffs first complaint without prejudice was 
signed on September 22,1993, over nine months after the statute of limitations expired. 
(R.3-4) 
9. Plaintiff then filed her second complaint on September 17, 1993 and again 
named as the sole defendant "Willowcreek Plaza." (R. 4 & 56) 
10. However, this time plaintiff served Valley Bank. (R. 4 & 15) 
11. Because they were not named as parties, Valley Bank and Dime Savings 
moved to dismiss on the grounds that they were not doing business as "Willowcreek 
Plaza." Id. 
12. Plaintiff opposed the motion arguing that the banks were in fact doing 
business as "Willowcreek Plaza" pursuant to Rule 17(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
5 
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Procedure. (R. 73) 
13. The Honorable Judge John A. Rokich ruled that the banks were indeed not 
doing business as "Willowcreek Plaza" and as such plaintiff could not bring suit against 
them in that name. (R. 4) He therefore dismissed plaintiffs second complaint without 
prejudice. Id 
14. The order dismissing this second lawsuit without prejudice was entered on 
January 17, 1994. Id 
15. Plaintiff then filed her third complaint on January 6,1994, this time naming 
Valley Bank and Dime Bank. (R. 5, 59) 
16. Plaintiff never pursued this third action, and instead chose to pursue an 
appeal of Judge Rokich's decision dismissing the second complaint. (R. 5) 
17. Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed her third complaint on February 22, 1994. 
(Court of Appeals Opinion, footnote 2) 
18. Plaintiffs appeal of the dismissal of her second complaint was unsuccessful 
on two separate occasions. 
19. Specifically, the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal, agreeing 
that Valley Bank was not doing business as "Willowcreek Plaza" and therefore could not 
be sued in that name. Hebertson v. Willowcreek Plaza. 895 P.2d 839 (Utah Ct. App. 
1995); see also (R. 63-65) 
20. Plaintiff thereafter filed a petition for writ of certiorari which was granted. 
6 
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Hebertson v. Willowcreek Plaza. 910 P.2d 425 (Utah 1995). 
21. The Utah Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals ruling. Hebertson v. 
Willowcreek Plaza. 923 P.2d 1389 (Utah 1996); see also (R. 71-74) 
22. Plaintiff thereafter filed her fourth complaint on May 23, 1997. (R. 1-7) 
23. Defendants again moved to dismiss plaintiffs fourth complaint arguing that 
the savings statute allows only one refiling and that the statute of limitations therefore 
barred plaintiff s fourth complaint. (R. 12-20) 
24. Defendants further argued that even if plaintiff was entitled to more than 
one refiling she could not add or name new parties not named in her first complaint. IcL 
25. In opposition, plaintiff argued that the Utah savings statute allows for more 
than one refiling and that regardless of how she referred to defendants in her various 
complaints, her cause of action had always been the same. (R. 23-33) 
26. Plaintiff also argued that the banks were doing business as "Willowcreek 
Plaza" and that her efforts in substituting the banks' names as the designated defendants 
in her fourth complaint did not impair her right to rely on the savings statute. (R. 29) 
27. Plaintiff also informed the trial court in her written opposition to 
defendants' motion to dismiss that she had initiated a legal malpractice lawsuit against 
her original attorney in the Third District Court styled Hebertson v. Dalby et. al.. Civil 
No. 960908024, filed November 20,1996, the Honorable Glenn K. Iwasaki presiding. 
(R. 27) 
7 
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28. After reading the briefs and listening to the oral argument of the parties, 
The Honorable Timothy R. Hanson granted defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiffs 
complaint on March 13, 1998. (R. 92/32) 
29. Because matters outside the pleadings were considered, the trial court 
treated the motion to dismiss as one for summary judgment and ruled that plaintiff was 
entitled to only one refiling after her first complaint was dismissed. (R. 83) 
30. The trial court further ruled that even if plaintiff was entitled to more than 
one refiling, she could not name new parties after the expiration of the statute of 
limitations. (R. 83) 
31. The order dismissing plaintiffs fourth complaint was entered on April 8, 
1998 and plaintiff filed her notice of appeal on May 7, 1998. LcL. 
32. On December 2, 1999, the Court of Appeals reversed the summary 
judgment and remanded the case for trial. (Court of Appeals Opinion, paragraph 20) 
ARGUMENT 
1. Plaintiffs first complaint naming a non-existent defendant is a 
complete nullity. Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40 therefore does not apply 
and Plaintiffs three subsequent refillings are barred by the statute of 
limitations. 
Plaintiffs first complaint was filed on November 24, 1992, just 38 days prior to 
the four-year statute of limitations deadline for filing litigation with respect to the slip and 
fall she claims occurred on December 31,1988. (R. 14-15) That complaint named as the 
8 
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sole defendant "Willowcreek Plaza." (R. 15) Because Willowcreek Plaza was a non-
entity and was incapable of suing or being sued, plaintiffs first complaint was dismissed 
pursuant to a motion to dismiss filed by the new owners of the building who had been 
served with process.1 
The order dismissing plaintiffs first complaint was issued in September of 1993, 
well over nine months after the applicable statute of limitations had expired. Because that 
complaint never named the appropriate defendant and in fact named a defendant that did 
not exist, the savings statute found at Utah Code Ann. §78-12-40 (1953) cannot operate to 
preserve a claim against a party who was never named, served, or joined as a party to the 
original action prior to the expiration of the statute of limitation. 
The case of Estate ofHaro v. Haro. 887 P.2d 878 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), 
demonstrates this principle in action. In Haro, the Utah Court of Appeals upheld the 
dismissal of a wrongful death lawsuit due to the would-be claimant's failure to name a 
plaintiff that had the capacity to sue on behalf of the heirs of the deceased. Plaintiffs had 
sued in the name of the "Estate of Martin Haro." Id They filed their complaint six 
weeks before the statute of limitations ran. IcL 
The defendants in Haro thereafter filed a motion to dismiss after the statute of 
limitations had run arguing that plaintiff had brought the suit in the name of an entity that 
1
 Even if plaintiff had named Willowcreek Plaza, L.C. in the first action the complaint 
would have been dismissed anyway because they did not own the property at the time of 
plaintiffs accident. 
9 
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did not have the capacity to sue. Plaintiffs moved to substitute the proper party pursuant 
to Rule 17(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The trial court denied the motion to 
substitute and dismissed the suit, ruling that plaintiffs had not initiated suit within the two 
year statute of limitations. Id The Haro court held that since the suit was brought by a 
party that lacked the capacity to bring the claim, the lawsuit was "a nullity" and therefore 
there was no suit or "cause of action in which to substitute parties." Id. at 879. Thus, 
even though the original suit was timely filed, the error in naming the proper party 
effectively wiped that suit clean from the books resulting in the expiration of the statute 
of limitations which barred further refilings. LdL at 879, n. 2. 
Dunn v. Kelly, 675 P.2d 571 (Utah 1983), is also on point. In Dunn, the original 
plaintiff filed a timely wrongful death lawsuit over the death of a purported relative. 
When it was determined that the plaintiff in the original action was in fact not related to 
the decedent, the case was dismissed without prejudice.2 Id Thereafter, a new second 
action was commenced, this time naming as plaintiffs the proper heirs. However, the 
second action was clearly filed after the two year statute of limitations had run. IdL at 
572. The trial court dismissed the second complaint holding that the statute of limitations 
barred the second action and the Utah Supreme Court affirmed. The parties in the first 
action were not the same as those named in the second action and § 78-12-40 therefore 
2As in this case, the original suit in Dunn was dismissed well after the statute of 
limitations for wrongful death claims expired. Id at p. 571-72 
10 
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did not apply and could not be used to resurrect their claims. Id. 
The Haro and Dunn decisions are consistent with case law from other jurisdictions 
who have addressed this issue from the perspective of a wrongly named defendant. (See 
e.g. McCoy Enterprises v. Vaughn, 268 S.E.2d 764 (Ga. App. 1980); Jordan v. 
Commissioners of Bristol County. 167 N.E. 652 (Mass. 1929); Day v. NLO Inc.. 798 
F.Supp. 1322 (S.D. Ohio 1992). 
Plaintiffs efforts to properly name and serve defendants here are untimely and 
improper. Plaintiff may not renew an action under the savings statute that never existed 
in the first place. She cannot now sue the proper defendants having failed to name, serve, 
or join them as defendants in the initial action prior to the running of the statute of 
limitations. The Court of Appeals' decision in this case is in conflict with the Haro and 
Dunn decisions, and should be reversed by this Court. 
2. Even if the savings statute applies, plaintiff is only entitled to one re-
filing of her complaint, not four. 
As indicated in the procedural history, this appeal is from plaintiffs fourth 
complaint. Therefore, even if §78-12-40 were applicable and plaintiff was entitled to 
refile her complaint after the first one was dismissed, the savings statute only allows for 
one refiling, not three. 
Utah's savings statute provides: 
If any action is commenced within due time and a judgment 
thereon for the plaintiff is reversed, or if the plaintiff fails in 
11 
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such action or upon a cause of action otherwise than upon the 
merits, and the time limited either by law or contract for 
commencement the same shall have expired, the plaintiff, or 
if he dies and the cause of action survives, his representatives, 
may commence a new action within one year after the 
reversal or failure. 
Id Perusal of this language indicates that the intent of the statue is to allow one refiling, 
not three as plaintiff has done here. 
This question has not been directly addressed by Utah appellate courts, and is an 
important question which should be settled by the Utah Supreme Court. The Court of 
Appeals in dicta has previously indicated that plaintiff is only entitled to one refiling. 
Specifically, in Meadow Fresh Farms, 813 P.2d 1216, the Honorable Judge Judith 
Billings writing for a unanimous panel stated in a footnote that §78-12-40 allowed for 
only one re-filing. 
Although we refrain from addressing the merits of whether 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40 permits unlimited successive 
dismissals and refilings, we note that many of the courts that 
have been faced with a similar question have concluded that 
in the interest of finality and judicial economy, a plaintiff is 
entitled to only one refiling pursuant to a savings statute. See 
e.g.. Hunter v.Ward 15 F.2d 843, 844 (8th Cir. 1926); 
Marangio v. Shop Rite Supermarkets, Inc.. 11 Conn.App. 
156, 55 A.2d 1389,1391 (1987), cert denied, 204 Conn. 809, 
528 A.2d 1155 (1987); Sylvester v. Steinberg, 152 Ill.App.3rd 
962,105 Ill.Dec. 902, 903, 505 N.E.2d 28,29 (1987); United 
States Fire Ins. Co. v. Swyden. 175 Okla. 475, 53 P.2d 284, 
288(1935). This conclusion is consistent with the language 
of the Utah saving statute as the statute speaks in terms of a 
singular rather than multiple dismissals: "a new action," "the 
reversal or failure". 
12 
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Id at 1221, n. 10 (emphasis in original). 
Many other states have held that only one refiling is allowed under a savings 
statute: Morrow v. Atlanta & C. Air Line Ry. Co.. 66 S.E. 186 (S.C. 1909)(interpreting 
South Carolina law); United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Swyden. 475, P.2d 284, 288 
(1935)(interpreting Oklahoma law); Turner v. N.C. & St. L. Railway. 285 S.W.2d 122 
(Tenn. 1955)(interpreting Tennessee law); Worley v. Pierce. 440 S.E.2d 749 (Ga. App. 
1994)(interpreting Georgia law); Rogozinski v. American Food Service Equip., 643 A.2d 
300 (Conn. App. 1994)(interpreting Connecticut law); Cady v. Harlan, 442 S.W.2d 517 
(Mo. 1969)(interpreting Missouri law); Hunter v. Ward. 15 F.2d 843 (8th Cir. 
1926)(interpreting Arkansas law); Sylvester v. Steinberg. 505 N.E.2d 28 (111. App., 4 Dist. 
1987)(interpreting Illinois law); Bush v. Cole. 110 N.E. 1056 (Ohio 1912) (interpreting 
Ohio law). 
Language from the Swyden opinion addresses the philosophical underpinnings of 
this majority position which allows only on refilling, not multiple refilings. 
We must remember that the grace period is not a release of 
the original limitation, nor even an extension thereof for all 
purposes, but is only a conditional, limited extension granted 
plaintiff because the suit which he did file in time, consumed 
some time in court before dismissal, carrying him beyond the 
original limitation date, possibly without any fault of his own. 
That he could file and dismiss as often as he desired within 
the original period of limitation has nothing to do with it, for 
at that time there was no bar at all. Once, however, he passes 
the bar he is on the law's own time, and is permitted to ignore 
the statute only by virtue of legislative exception especially 
13 
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created for the occasion. Thus, good reason appears to 
support the general rule and inteipretation of such statutes, to 
the effect that the legislatures of the various states, in 
extending litigants the privilege of filing actions out of time, 
mean just what they express by the words "commence a new' 
action,"and that they do not thereby intend that plaintiffs may 
file as many new actions as they desire, all within the year. 
Had that been their intention, then such statutes would have 
been worded in the language of the ordinary statutes of 
limitation, with minor changes. To give such an 
interpretation as desired by plaintiff would do violence to the 
letter, spirit, meaning, and purpose of the statute. 
Swyden 53 P.2d at 2883. 
In Pintavalle v. Valkanos. 581 A.2d 1050 (Conn. 1990), the Connecticut Supreme 
Court stated that plaintiffs interpretation of the savings statute "would have the effect of 
permitting a potentially limitless extension of the time to file succeeding actions. This 
would defeat the basic purpose of statutes of limitation, namely, promoting finality in the 
litigation process. Although § 52-592 is a remedial statute and must be construed 
liberally; it should not be construed so liberally as to render statutes of limitation virtually 
meaningless." IdL at 1052 (citations omitted). 
If accepted, plaintiffs arguments here would essentially render the statute of 
limitations meaningless. It should be noted that §78-12-40 is found within the heart of 
3Although the facts in Swyden involved multiple refilings (three not including the 
original) within the one year savings period, the Oklahoma Supreme Court cited affirmatively to 
other cases where the first refilling occurred outside the original one year savings period. Thus, 
it does not matter if the second or third refilings occurred within or without the savings period 
because the statute allowed but one refilling. 
14 
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the Limitation of Actions chapter of the Judicial Code. It therefore must be construed and 
harmonized to work within the overall purpose of the act. 
Plaintiff has exercised her one opportunity to file a lawsuit beyond the applicable 
statute of limitations assuming § 78-12-40 applies. That filing was dismissed. Plaintiff 
sought appellate review and obtained two opinions from both appellate courts of this state 
denying her claims and upholding the dismissal. Since plaintiff is now on her third 
refilling from which this appeal is taken, she has clearly exceeded the ambit of § 78-12-40 
and the trial court's ruling should be upheld. 
3. Whether Plaintiff is allowed one or multiple refilings under § 78-12-40, 
she nevertheless cannot name new parties who were not named in the 
original complaint and who have no identity of interest to the 
defendant named in her first complaint. 
Plaintiff argues that her efforts to name the correct defendants in this action should 
relate back to the first complaint which was filed within the applicable statute of 
limitations. However, the law is clear that one may not add new parties to a lawsuit and 
have that amendment relate back to the original filing for purposes of preserving the 
statute of limitations. 
At first blush, plaintiffs arguments appear to rely on Rule 15(c) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. This rule governs the relation back of amendments to pleadings and 
allows a party to amend their existing pleadings and have them relate back to original 
complaint or filing. However, plaintiff has not argued Rule 15(c) and rightly so. Case 
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law explicitly states that Rule 15(c) does not generally allow amendments to the 
pleadings to include new parties since such amendments would amount to the assertion of 
a new cause of action and defeat the very purpose of a statute of limitation: Perry, 681 
P.2dat218. 
However, a narrow exception to this general rule allows new parties to be added 
and related back to the original complaint where there is an identity of interest between 
the old and new parties. Id at 217. Here, there is no identity of interest between 
defendants who actually owned the property at the time of the accident and "Willowcreek 
Plaza", a name on a building and the only named defendant in the original complaint and 
plaintiffs first refilling. "Willowcreek Plaza" is a non-entity. It cannot sue or be sued. 
Furthermore, both this Court and the Utah Supreme Court have rejected plaintiffs prior 
assertions that the banks were doing business as Willowcreek Plaza. See Hebertson v. 
Willowcreek Plaza. 895 P.2d 839 (Utah Ct. App. 1995)(cert. granted at 910 P.2d 425). 
Hebertson v. Willowcreek Plaza. 923 P.2d 1389 (Utah 1996). 
Williams v. Zortman Mining. Inc., 914 P.2d 971 (Mont. 1996) is on point. 
In Zortman, the plaintiff sued the parent company of a wholly owned subsidiary 
corporation. Zortman actually was employed by the subsidiary and his claims of 
discrimination in the workplace was in reality against his employer, not its parent 
company. The federal court dismissed Zortman's claims for his attempt to "manipulate 
the diversity jurisdiction of the federal court." Id at 972. He thereafter sued the 
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subsidiary (his employer and the proper party) in state court after the statute of limitations 
expired. Id. 
Citing Turner v. Aldor Co. of Nashville. Inc.. 827 S.W.2d 318, 321 (Tenn. Ct. 
App. 1991), the Zortman court stated : "We agree that the 'savings statute' does not 
apply to save or 'renew' a complaint against a party not named in the original complaint." 
Id. at 973. Zortman goes on to agree with McCoy referenced elsewhere in this brief that 
the second suit should be dismissed even if the proper corporate defendant had actual 
notice of the first suit since the first suit failed to name it or a company with whom it held 
a sufficient identity of interest and the statute of limitations expired before the proper 
party was sued. Id. 
Plaintiff argues that the equities of the identity of interest rule and the general 
principle of fairness dictate that cases ought to be heard on the merits, not disposed of 
based on technical applications of the law to the facts at hand. While defendants would 
agree with this principle as a general rule, such equities do not apply to the requirements 
of naming the correct parties and satisfying the statute of limitations. 
Plaintiffs naming of the wrong parties is more than a "form of pleading error". As 
a Massachucets court explained in Jordan v. Commissioners of Bristol County, 167 N.E. 
652 (Mass. 1929): 
However, plaintiff, cause of action and defendant cannot be 
regarded as "form" within this definition. Misnomer or 
misdescription of any of these substantive elements may be 
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"matter of form," but the mistaken choice of a defendant 
unrelated to the subject-matter of the case is not merely a 
formal error. 
Id. at 654. Utah courts agree with this position. See, Perry v. Pioneer Wholesale Supply 
Co.T 681 P.2d214, 217 (Utah 1984). 
Rule 15(c) does not allow the naming of new parties to relate back to the original 
filing absent an identity of interest between the old and new parties. See also. Haro, 887 
P.2d at 879, n.2. (Plaintiffs first suit was a nullity and plaintiff could not revive their 
action after the statute of limitations period where the first suit was brought by a plaintiff 
who lacked the capacity to sue.) .,,,*. 
While this case represents the improper naming of a defendant, the logic of Haro 
and Perry are on point and demonstrate that naming the proper party is critical to 
maintaining an action and such errors is pleading cannot be dismissed as minor or 
excusable under the relaxed "form-of-pleading" rules. 
Plaintiffs lawsuit filed against "Willowcreek Plaza" was a nullity. It was brought 
against an entity that did not exist and lacked the capacity to be sued. As such there is no 
complaint to which any attempted amendment or addition of new parties could relate 
back to sufficient to avoid the statute of limitations which ran shortly after plaintiff filed 
her first complaint and years before she finally named the proper defendants. While 
plaintiff likely views these arguments as unfair and harsh, they nevertheless comport with 
Utah law and the purpose of statutes of limitation. See, Lee v. Gaufin. 867 P.2d 572, 575 
18 
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(Utah 1993) (statutes of limitations "do not abolish a substantive right to sue, but simply 
provide that if an action is not filed within the specified time, the remedy is deemed to 
have been waived The barring of the remedy is caused by a plaintiffs failure to take 
reasonable steps to assert the cause of action within the time afforded by statute."). 
In conclusion, plaintiff failed to take "reasonable steps" to assert her cause of 
action when she filed her first complaint six years ago. She named a non-entity that 
lacked the capacity to be sued and she served an entity that had no involvement or 
relationship to the accident in question. This utter failure on her part to properly initiate 
her lawsuit when she or her counsel knew they were on the eve of the statute of 
limitations expiration date is fatal to her claims and all other efforts including the second, 
third and fourth complaints cannot revive an action that by law is a nullity and was never 
filed in compliance with the statute of limitations in the first place. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff never complied with the statute of limitations in the first place insofar as 
these defendants are concerned. Even if the savings statute applies to her first dismissal 
she is entitled to only one refilling, not three. Finally, her efforts to correct her mistake in 
naming the wrong defendants through amendment or relation back to her original 
complaint are not proper. Utah law clearly prohibits her efforts to add new parties in 
subsequent refilings. Therefore, the trial court's summary judgment against plaintiffs 
complaint for statute of limitations purposes should be affirmed, and the Court of Appeals 
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opinion should be reversed. 
DATED this tf* day of January, 2000. 
SMITH & GLAUSER, P.C. 
Richard K. Glauser 
D. Joseph Cartwright 
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This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
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ORME, Judge: 
Hi Plaintiff Randi Hebertson appeals the trial court's award of 
summary judgment in favor of defendants Bank One, Utah, formerly 
known as Valley Bank & Trust Company (Bank One), and Dime Savings 
Bank of New York, FSB (Dime Savings). Because we conclude that 
the savings statute, Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40 (1996), permits a 
plaintiff to refile timely successive actions after each is 
dismissed, so long as the dismissal is not on the merits and the 
refiled action is substantially the same as the previous action, 
we reverse. 
BACKGROUND 
112 "In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we consider the 
facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, here 
the appellant[] ." Parker v. Dodqion, 971 P.2d 496, 496-97 (Utah 
1998) . 
1|3 This appeal affords this court a second occasion to consider 
Ms. Hebertson's attempt to recover for injuries sustained in 
1988. On December 31 of that year, while accompanying her 
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daughter to an appointment at Willowcreek Plaza, a professional 
office complex in Salt Lake County, Hebertson slipped and fell on 
some ice, sustaining an injury to her back that required multiple 
surgeries. Within the next three days, Hebertson contacted the 
building manager, who referred her to the building's insurance 
carrier, State Farm Insurance. Having been unable to reach a 
settlement of her claim with the insurer, Hebertson filed a 
complaint against "Willowcreek Plaza" approximately one month 
before the statute of limitations was to expire and served 
process upon a manager employed by Willowcreek Plaza, L.C. As it 
turned out, however, although Willowcreek Plaza, L.C. owned the 
office complex when the complaint was filed, at the time of the 
"accident it was owned by Bank One and Dime Savings, which had 
acquired it by foreclosure.1 
1)4 On the motion of Willowcreek Plaza, L.C, the trial court 
dismissed this first action without prejudice. Relying on the 
savings statute in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40 (1996), Hebertson 
filed a second complaint, again naming "Willowcreek Plaza" in the 
caption as the defendant, but naming in the body of the complaint 
and serving Bank One and Dime Savings. See Hebertson v. 
Willowcreek Plaza, 923 P.2d 1389, 1391 (Utah 1996). Bank One and 
Dime Savings contended they could not be sued under the name 
Willowcreek Plaza and moved to dismiss. The trial court granted 
the motion. See id. Although Hebertson objected to dismissal of 
this action, she did not move to amend the complaint to conform 
the parties named in the caption to those described in the 
complaint's body. Rather, she insisted that Bank One and Dime 
Savings were doing business under the name Willowcreek Plaza and 
thus could be sued under that name. See id. See generally Utah 
R. Civ. P. 17(d). In Hebertson v. Willowcreek Plaza, 895 P.2d 
839, 841 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), this court rejected that 
contention and upheld the dismissal. The Utah Supreme Court 
affirmed our decision.2 See Hebertson v. Willowcreek Plaza, 923 
P.2d 1389, 1392 (Utah 1996). 
%5 Within a year of the Supreme Court's affirmance of the 
second complaint's dismissal, and again relying on the savings 
statute, Hebertson filed her fourth complaint, naming Bank One 
1. At oral argument in this appeal, counsel for defendants 
confirmed that defendants and Willowcreek, L.C. had the same 
insurer and attorney. 
2. After dismissal of the second complaint, Hebertson again 
relied on the savings statute and filed a third complaint, naming 
Bank One and Dime Savings in the caption as defendants. However, 
electing to appeal the second complaint's dismissal, Hebertson 
never served and, ultimately, voluntarily dismissed the third 
complaint. 
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and Dime Savings as defendants in both the caption and body. On_ 
June 16, 1997, Bank One and Dime Savings were served with a 
summons and a copy of this fourth complaint. Bank One' and Dime 
Savings moved to dismiss this action under Rule 12(b)(6), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing that the savings statute did 
not apply beyond a single refiling and the action was therefore 
barred by the statute of limitations. Hebertson opposed the 
motion, arguing that the savings statute allows multiple 
refilings. Because it considered matters outside the pleadings, 
the trial court correctly treated the motion as one for summary 
judgment, see Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b), 56(c); DOIT, Inc. v. Touche, 
Ross & Co., 926 P.2d 835, 838 n.3 (Utah 1996), and granted 
'summary judgment in favor of Bank One and Dime Savings. The 
trial court ruled that the savings statute allows only a single 
refiling and that even if multiple refilings were allowed, 
Hebertson could not include new defendants in the refiled action. 
Hebertson again appeals. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
%6 " ' Summary judgment is appropriate only when no genuine issue 
of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.' Because the question of whether 
summary judgment is appropriate is a question of law, we accord 
no deference to the trial court." Parker v. Dodgion, 971 P.2d 
496, 497 (Utah 1998) (quoting Hiaains v. Salt Lake County, 855 
P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993)). 
MULTIPLE REFILINGS UNDER THE SAVINGS STATUTE 
%7 This case squarely presents us for the first time with the 
issue of whether the savings statute permits a plaintiff to file 
more than one new action after a dismissal not on the merits.3 
To resolve this issue we must construe Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40 
(1996) . 
1^8 "In matters of statutory construction, ' [t]he best evidence 
of the true intent and purpose of the Legislature in enacting 
[an] Act is the plain language of the Act.'" Platts v. Parents 
3. Although in Meadow Fresh Farms, Inc. v. Utah State 
University, 813 P.2d 1216 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), this court 
intimated that section 78-12-40 may not permit successive 
refilings, see id. at 1221 n.10, we concluded the issue was not 
ripe for adjudication and expressly stated "it would not be 
proper for this court to render a definitive opinion on the 
permissibility of refiling an action under Utah Code Ann. § 78-
12-40 more than once." Id. at 1220-21. 
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Helping Parents, 947 P.2d 658, 662 (Utah 1997) (quoting Jensen v. 
Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 679 P.2d 903, 906 (Utah 1984)). 
See also Sierra Club v. Utah Solid & Hazardous Waste Control Bd. , 
964 P.2d 335, 345 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) ("' [W]here the statutory 
language is plain and unambiguous, [the court] will not look 
beyond it to divine legislative intent.1") (quoting Utah Sign, 
Inc. v. Utah Dep't of Transp., 896 P.2d 632, 633-34 (Utah 1995)). 
Moreover, we "assume that 'each term in the statute was used 
advisedly.'" Id. (quoting Savage Indus., Inc. v. State Tax 
Comm'n, 811 P.2d 664, 670 (Utah 1991)). 
%9 The Utah savings statute provides: 
If any action is commenced within due 
time and a judgment thereon for the plaintiff 
is reversed, or if the plaintiff fails in 
such action or upon a cause of action 
otherwise than upon the merits, and the time 
limited either by law or contract for 
commencing the same shall have expired, the 
plaintiff, or if he dies and the cause of 
action survives, his representatives, may 
commence a new action within one year after 
the reversal or failure. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40 (1996). By beginning with the word 
"if," the statute suggests a s€>t of conditions will follow.4 It 
then recites conditions, the occurrence of which invokes the 
application of the statutory consequences. The conditions are: 
(1) "any action is commenced within due time and a judgment 
thereon for the plaintiff is reversed;" or (2) "the plaintiff 
fails in such action [--i.e., any action commenced within due 
time--]or upon a cause of action otherwise than upon the merits;" 
and (3) the applicable limitations period has expired. Id. See 
also Hansen v. Department of Fin. Insts., 858 P.2d 184, 187 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1993) (holding savings statute did not apply where 
action was dismissed within original limitations period). 
1|l0 Because the first two conditions were drafted in the 
disjunctive, Hebertson need only satisfy one of them and the 
Third condition for the statute to apply. The third condition 
was clearly satisfied here because the limitations period had 
long since expired. See Hebertson, 923 P.2d at 1390. Because 
there was no reversal of a judgment for Hebertson, and thus the 
4. For example, Webster's defines "if" as synonymous with "in 
the event that: in case" and "so long as: on condition that." 
Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1124 (1976). Cf. 
Black's Law Dictionary 746 (6th ed. 1990) ("In deeds and wills, 
this word, as a rule, implies a condition precedent[.]"). 
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first condition does not apply, if Hebertson satisfies the second 
alternative condition--i.e.# that "the plaintiff fails in [any 
action commenced within due time] otherwise than upon the 
merits"--the savings statute applies. Here, because the trial 
court dismissed the second complaint without prejudice, the 
action did not fail on the merits. The question remains whether 
it was filed "within due time." If it was, the action commenced 
with plaintiff's fourth complaint was timely because it was filed 
within one year of the Utah Supreme Court's affirmance of the 
dismissal of plaintiff's second complaint. If the second action 
was not filed "within due time" for purposes of the savings 
statute, plaintiff had no right to file the fourth complaint. 
i[ll Our Supreme Court has already held that, for purposes of the 
savings statute, an action is "commenced" when the new complaint 
is filed. See Muir v. W.H. Burt Explosives, Inc., 851 P.2d 645, 
647 (Utah 1993). Further, the term "within" denotes "on the 
inside or on the inner side" and "inside the bounds of a place or 
region," Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2627 
(1976), while "due" refers to that which is "[j]ust; proper; 
regular; lawful; sufficient." Black's Law Dictionary 499 (6th 
ed. 1990). Hence, an "action commenced within due time" refers 
to an action filed inside the period of time authorized by law. 
|^12 Defendants would have us equate "action commenced within due 
time" narrowly, i.e., as being an action commenced within the 
time allowed by the applicable statute of limitations. This view 
overlooks that the savings statute itself establishes a time 
frame within which to file an action, indeed, an action that 
would be untimely under the statute of limitations. Accordingly, 
we believe that Hebertson's second action was "commenced within 
due time" when she filed it within the year authorized by the 
savings statute. 
Hl3 The plain language of section 78-12-40 is simply no bar to 
serial recourse to the savings statute. Therefore, Hebertson's 
fourth action was timely because it was brought within one year 
of the failure, not on the merits, of her second action, which 
had been filed "within due time" under the savings statute. 
Simply stated, if the Legislature meant to limit the savings 
statute to a single use per cause of action, it would have 
avoided general phraseology like "within due time" and stated its 
intention clearly, a simple thing to do. See, e.g., Ga. Code 
Ann. § 9-2-61 (Supp. 1998) (providing that "this privilege of 
renewal shall be exercised only once"); Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-1-
105 (Supp. 1998) (authorizing refiling only for those actions 
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that failed other than on the merits and were "commenced within 
the time limited by a rule or statute of limitation").5 
Hl4 Consistent with the dicta in Meadow Fresh Farms, Inc. v. 
Utah State University. 813 P.2d 1216 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), see 
supra note 3, Bank One and Dime Savings argue that the statute's 
use of singular articles--i.e., "may commence a new action within 
one year after the reversal or failure"--contemplates only one 
refiling.6 Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40 (1996) (emphasis added). 
5. We acknowledge that some courts in other states have reached 
the opposite conclusion when reviewing their own savings 
statutes. Nonetheless, because these decisions interpret 
statutes with language distinct from that in our savings statute, 
these interpretations are unpeirsuasive. See, e.g.. Estate of 
Pintavalle v. Valkanos, 581 A.2d 1050, 1052-53 (Conn. 1990) 
(holding that the multiple refilings expressly authorized by 
Connecticut's savings statute must all be made within one year of 
the failure of the first action, described by the statute as the 
"original action"); Worley v. Pierce, 440 S.E.2d 749, 750 (Ga. 
Ct. App. 1994) (holding that by stating the "privilege of renewal 
shall be exercised only once," the savings statute permitted only 
one refiling); Foster v. Pettiiohn, 213 S.W.2d 487, 490 (Mo. 
1948) (holding that its statute allowing refiling "from time to 
time, within one year" permitted multiple refilings, but not 
beyond the one-year savings period). We also recognize that 
other jurisdictions have determined that their statutes, which 
are more similar to Utah's, do not permit multiple refilings. 
See, e.g., Sylvester v. Steinberg, 505 N.E.2d 28, 29 (111. App. 
Ct. 1987) (holding that the statute did not permit multiple 
refilings although it "d[id] not contain express limitations on 
the number of voluntary dismissals and refilings available"); 
Denton v. City of Atchison, 90 P. 764, 765 (Kan. 1907) (statute 
did not permit successive refilings after the initial one-year 
savings period); Hull v. Rich, 354 P.2d 903, 904 (Okla. 1993) 
(statute permitted only one refiling). Nevertheless, we find 
these decisions ultimately unpersuasive, largely because they 
turn more on policy considerations than plain meaning. In Utah, 
courts are not so quick to veer from a statute's plain meaning 
and undertake a foray into the realm of policy. See, e.g., Olsen 
v. Samuel Mclntvre Inv. Co., 956 P.2d 257, 259 (Utah 1998) 
("'Only when we find ambiguity in the statute's plain language 
need we seek guidance from the legislative history and relevant 
policy considerations.'") (quoting World Peace Movement of Am. v. 
Newspaper Agency Corp., 879 P.2d 253, 259 (Utah 1994)). 
6. Defendants do not address the rule of statutory construction 
in Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-12(1)(a) (Supp. 1999), which provides 
that "[t]he singular number includes the plural, and the plural 
(continued...) 
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We believe such an inference is neutralized by the statute's 
prior reference to "any action . . . commenced within due time." 
Id. (emphasis added). See Webster's Third New International 
Dictionary 97 (1976) (defining "any" as "one indifferently out of 
more than two[J one or some indiscriminately of whatever kind" 
and stating it is "used as a function word especially] in 
interrogative and conditional expressions to indicate one that is 
not a particular or definite individual of the given category"). 
Although other courts have construed similar language to permit a 
plaintiff to file only one new action, see United States Fire 
Ins. Co. v. Swyden, 53 P.2d 284, 285-88 (Okla. 1935) (holding 
that "commence a new action" did not authorize multiple 
*refilings), such a result is not universal. See Sharp Bros: 
Contracting Co. v. Westvaco Corp., 817 P.2d 547, 551 (Colo, Ct. 
App.) (noting that "'a new action' [does not] mean only one new 
action") (emphasis added), cert, denied, 1991 Colo. LEXIS 662 
(Colo. 1991). 
Hl5 We reject defendants' contention that our decision will make 
the course of lawsuits uncertain or open the floodgates on the 
stream of litigation. Plaintiffs have little natural interest in 
filing multiple unproductive actions or paying multiple filing 
fees. Moreover, the savings statute is limited to actions that 
are not resolved on the merits and to circumstances where an . 
action was originally brought within the limitations period. 
Further, multiple refilings in cases such as these are rarely 
needed because generally plaintiffs will be given the opportunity 
to simply amend their complaints to remedy these kinds of 
deficiencies. See Utah R. Civ. P. 15(a), 21; Sulzen v. Williams, 
977 P.2d 497, 501-02 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) (concluding trial court 
abused its discretion in denying motion to amend complaint so 
that caption would name correct parties, which were described in 
body). Moreover, if any action is filed "for any improper 
purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or 
needless increase in the cost of litigation," the party and/or 
counsel may be sanctioned. Utah R. Civ. P. 11(b)(1) . 
1|l6 Because the Supreme Court's affirmance of the dismissal of 
Hebertson's second complaint occurred less than one year before 
Hebertson filed her fourth complaint, that complaint was timely 
under the savings statute. The terms of the savings statute do 
not include a "once per customer" limitation. Accordingly, the 
trial court erred in concluding that Hebertson's fourth complaint 
was barred by the statute of limitations. 
6. (...continued) 
the singular." 
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ADDITION OF "NEW" PARTIES 
Hl7 We now turn to Bank One and Dime Savings's argument that 
even if we permit successive refilings under the savings statute, 
Bank One and Dime Savings could not be added as new parties in 
the fourth action. Their general position in this regard has 
merit. Unlike statutes of limitation that provide a general time 
period in which a plaintiff may file any action arising out of a 
given occurrence, the savings statute affords a means only to 
renew the earlier action. Consequently, the "saving statute does 
not apply when the new action is brought against a different 
defendant than was the first one, or by a different plaintiff." 
'51 Am. Jur. 2d Limitation of Actions § 318, at 820-21 (1970) . 
See Dunn v. Kelly, 675 P.2d 571, 572 (Utah 1983) (holding that to 
invoke the savings statute, the party bringing the subsequent 
saved action must have been a "party to the original lawsuit who 
had affirmatively sought relief therein"). Thus, the refiled 
action is "new" only in the sense that it results from the filing 
of a different complaint. See Black's Law Dictionary 1042 (6th 
ed. 1990) (explaining that "new" "ordinarily . . . is a purely 
relative term and is employed in contrasting the date, origin, or 
character of one thing with the corresponding attributes of 
another thing of the same kind or class").7 
7. Equally important as relying on the statute's plain language 
is the rule "that a statute should be construed as a whole, with 
all of its provisions construed to be harmonious with each other 
and with the overall legislative objective of the statute." 
Nixon v. Salt Lake City Corp., 898 P.2d 265, 268 (Utah 1995). 
See Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-2 (1996) ("The statutes . . . and all 
proceedings under them are to be liberally construed with a view 
to effect the objects of the statutes and to promote justice."); 
State v. Redd, 954 P.2d 230, 235 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (" [A] ny 
interpretation of statutory language that would nullify other 
statutory provisions is improper."); Ferro v. Utah Dep!t of 
Commerce, 828 P.2d 507, 513-14 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (rejecting 
interpretation that would "rewrite the Act and impermissibly 
render [another section] a complete nullity"). Without the 
requirement that the claims be substantially the same, a lazy 
plaintiff could easily avoid the diligence that statutes of 
limitation are meant to promote by filing an action at the 
eleventh hour against anybody; then filing a notice of dismissal 
before service or obtaining a dismissal for failure to prosecute, 
using the extra time to figure out who to sue; and then filing a 
new complaint a year later. Such a result would eviscerate our 
statutes of limitation and undermine their purpose of 
"requir[ing] that claims be advanced while the evidence to rebut 
them is still fresh" and would burden courts and parties with 
"'stale' claims, where the facts in dispute occurred so long ago 
(continued...) 
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Ul8 However, the prevailing view is that the prior and refiled 
actions need only be substantially the same. Thus, "a change of 
parties does not preclude an application of the statute where the 
change is merely nominal or the interest represented in the 
renewed action [is] identical with that in the original action." 
51 Am. Jur. 2d Limitation of Actions § 318, at 821 (1970) . This 
is consistent with the approach taken in a closely related 
context. When a pleading is amended after expiration of the 
limitations period, such amendment will relate back to the 
original filing if it "merely restates in a different form the 
cause of action originally pleaded." Id. § 234, at 787. See 
Wilcox v. Geneva Rock Corp., 911 P.2d 367, 369 (Utah 1996). 
'Because the basic inquiry is the same for determining whether a 
"change" in defendants is within the scope of the savings statute 
as it is for determining if such a change relates back under Rule 
15(c), we adopt the same test.8 That is, just as with the 
relation back of an amendment, a refiled action is substantially 
the same as the original and is thus authorized by the savings 
statute where the new and old "[p]arties have an identity of 
interest [such that] 'the real parties in interest were 
sufficiently alerted to the proceedings, or were involved in them 
unofficially, from an early stage.'" Sulzen v. Williams, 977 
P.2d 497, 501 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) (quoting Doxey-Lavton Co. v. 
Clark, 548 P.2d 902, 906 (Utah 1976)).. See also Wilcox, 911 P.2d 
at 369-70 ("'[A]n amendment which substitutes or adds new parties 
. . . relat[es] back, as to both plaintiff and defendant, when 
new and old parties have an identity of interest; so it can be 
assumed or proved the relation back is not prejudicial.'") 
(quoting Doxey-Layton Co., 548 P.2d at 906). 
Hl9 We conclude, as a matter of law, that Bank One and Dime 
Savings had a sufficient identity of interest with Willowcreek 
Plaza and were sufficiently alerted to the proceedings resulting 
from the second complaint. Thus, the action commenced with the 
fourth complaint is substantially the same as that commenced with 
the second complaint and, therefore, is within the scope of 
section 78-12-40. In Sulzen, we held that the trial court abused 
its discretion in denying amendment to the complaint's caption to 
substitute parties where the proper parties were named in the 
body of the complaint and served with process. See Sulzen, 977 
P.2d at 501 ("'"If the body of the complaint correctly identifies 
the party . . . courts generally will allow an amendment under 
7 . (...continued) 
that evidence was either forgotten or manufactured." 51 Am. Jur. 
2d Limitation of Actions § 17, at 602-03 (1970). 
8. Significantly, both sides have applied Rule 15(c) analysis in 
their briefs, thus implicitly recognizing that this approach is 
appropriate. 
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Rule 15 to correct technical defects in the caption.11111) (quoting 
Wilcox, 911 P.2d at 370) (other citation omitted; omission in 
original). This case is remarkably similar. That is/ 
notwithstanding the second complaint's caption, Bank One and Dime 
Savings were described as defendants in the body of the complaint 
and were actually served. This is sufficient notice to bring the 
fourth complaint within the savings statute as a matter of law.9 
CONCLUSION 
K2 0 We hold that the trial court erred in granting summary 
judgment in favor of defendants Bank One and Dime Savings. By 
its plain language, Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40 (1996) allows a 
plaintiff to refile a new action each time a prior action fails 
other than on the merits, provided the new action is filed within 
one year of such failure. However, because the renewed action 
must be substantially the same as that in the prior action, new 
parties may be added only if, because of sufficient identity of 
interest, the addition is not prejudicial. In this case, Bank 
One and Dime Savings had such an identity of interest with 
Willowcreek Plaza and no prejudice is apparent. Therefore 
section 78-12-40 applies to Hebertson's fourth complaint 
notwithstanding the change in the caption. Accordingly, we 
reverse the summary judgment and remand the case for trial or 
such other proceedings as may now be appropriate. 
Gregory K^Orme, Judge ~~ 
121 WE CONCUR: 
Michael J. Wilkins, 
Presiding Judge 
9. Additional facts indicate Bank One and Dime Savings had 
actual notice and reinforce this conclusion. For example, Bank 
One and Dime Savings's insurance carrier had notice of 
Hebertson's claim and injuries only a few days after the incident 
and long before Hebertson filed any action. 
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